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NORTH CAROLINA L W REVIEW
struck between the individuars right to privacy and the public's interest
in regulation. By not opening the gates of all businesses engaged in
interstate commerce to government inspectors, but yet applying the
more lenient administrative probable cause standard, Barlow's will al-
low the Court to seek that proper balance.
H. BRYAN IVES, III
Constitutional Law-Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Haderman v. Pennhurst Closes State Institution and
Mandates Community Care
Until the middle of this century the mentally retarded, neglected
by the medical profession, were routinely consigned for life to isolated
institutions.' During the last two decades, however, medical advances
regarding the capabilities and treatment of the retarded2 have spurred
judicial recognition of the rights of that institutionalized population.
Recent cases have held, principally on the basis of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments, that institutionalized retardates possess a right to
habilitation-the education, training, and care required by mentally re-
tarded individuals to reach their maximum development.'
This right to habilitation was first recognized and applied in Wyatt
v. Sticlney4 to mandate minimum standards of care and supervision
I. An excellent discussion of the historical treatment of the mentally retarded appears in
Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mental, Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal
and Scientjfe Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124 (1976).
2. Id. at 136-43. A recent paper credits "mid-twentieth century discoveries (or redis-
coveries) of the capacities of disabled people, of teaching and learning techniques to evoke those
capacities and the more or less wide distribution of knowledge of those techniques among school
people and other service agents in our society." T. Gilhool & E. Sturtman, Integration of Severely
Handicapped Students: Toward Criteria for Implementing and Enforcing the Integration Impera-
tive of P.L. 94-142 and Section 504, at 7 (1978) (unpublished paper for Public Interest Law Center
of Philadelphia).
3. Habilitation is defined in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972),
as
the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and main-
tain those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his
own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and
social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, struc-
tured education and treatment.
4. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to treatment for mentally ill); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to
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within the institution.' Recently, in Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hospital,6 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania went one significant step further and found
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a large, isolated state institution
for the mentally retarded,7 inherently incapable of providing its resi-
dents the minimally adequate habilitation that courts in previous cases"
had ordered the institutions to provide. Instead of requiring improve-
ments in the institution's staffing, programming, and funding, the court
directed that Pennhurst be closed and that suitable facilities in the com-
munity9 be provided for all its residents.10
The Pennhurst plaintiffs, originally all retarded residents of the in-
stitution, brought a class action 1 seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, including the closing of Pennhurst, and damages 12 on the ground
that they were being denied their right to habilitation. They claimed
habilitation for mentally retarded), affd in part, rev'dinpart sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (Wyatt is a series of decisions with the same style).
5. 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972). For a discussion of the minimum
standards in Wyatt, see note 53 infra.
6. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), stay denied, 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-148 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 1978).
7. Pennhurst, located 30 miles from Philadelphia, was built in 1908,446 F. Supp. at 1302, at
the height of the out-of-sight, out-of-mind philosophy of treatment for the retarded. Id. at 1299-
300.
8. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), af'dinpart, vacatedinpart,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
9. Alternative community facilities can take many forms, supplying a great variety of resi-
dential options and support services that represent a continuum of models from the least restric-
tive to the the highly structured. Among the possible residential options are developmental
homes; intensive training residences for children, for adolescents, and for adults; family living
residences; adult minimum supervision residences; room and board homes; adult boarding; cluster
apartments; independent living with available counseling; five-day residences; behavior-shaping
residences; developmental maximization units; crisis assistance units; crisis homes; structured cor-
rectional residences; and structured rehabilitation residences. See Glenn, The Least Restrictive
Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of Normalization, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499, 507-12 (1976).
All of these facilities afford the mentally retarded some degree of contact with normal community
living patterns, primarily because of their location within the community but also because of their
smaller size and less rigid structure.
Expert testimony showed that all the retarded at Pennhurst, even the most severely handi-
capped, were capable of benefiting from community-centered facilities. 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
10. 446 F. Supp. at 1320, 1326.
11. The plaintiff class of retarded persons was defined as "[alil persons who as of May 30,
1974, and at any time subsequent, have been or may become residents of Pennhurst State School
and Hospital." This included residents, those who were on a waiting list for placement at Penn-
hurst, and those who, "because of the unavailability of alternate services in the community,"
might have been placed at Pennhurst. Id. at 1300.
12. Id. at 1298, 1324.
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violations of both state1 3 and federal 14 statutes and the first, eighth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."'
Defendants-Pennhurst, its supervisor and employees, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare, and various state and county
officials'--denied that conditions at Pennhurst violated its residents'
constitutional or statutory rights.17 They agreed, however, that Penn-
hurst's staff of 1,500 was extremely inadequate for its patient popula-
tion of 1,230, seventy-four percent of whom were profoundly
retarded, 8 and admitted that they already had plans for a drastic re-
duction of the population, 19 although their timetable for the eventual
closing of the institution was "vague and indefinite.""z
Finding that minimally adequate habilitation is properly provided
only by living arrangements as much like a normal family living situa-
tion as possible 2 the court concluded that because of institutional con-
ditions antithetical to this "normalization" principle,2z "minimally
adequate habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as
Pennhurst."23 The court entered judgment for plaintiffs; defendants
13. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1967) (repealed in part in 1976; application to mentally retarded unaffected).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986, 6010 (1970).
15. 446 F. Supp. at 1298 nn. 2 & 3.
16. Id. at 1301-02 & 1301 n.13.
17. Id. at 1313.
18. Id. at 1302-03. The institutional population was very similar to that in other institutions
for the retarded. Ferleger, The Future of Institutions for Retarded Citizens: The Promise of the
Pennhurst Case, in MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT
COURT CASES 28, 32 (1978) (compilation prepared for President's Committee on Mental
Retardation).
19. 446 F. Supp. at 1306.
20. Id. at 1325.
21. See also note 41 and accompanying text infra.
22. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Much of the court's opinion is a catalog of institutional horrors. In
32 days of testimony, id. at 1300, and eight pages of the opinion, id. at 1303-Il, the problems at
Penhurst were set forth. Implicitly measuring Permhurst against the detailed minimum institu-
tional standards developed by the federal district court in Wyatt v. Stickney for Partlow Hospital
for the mentally retarded, see note 53 infra, Judge Broderick found that "[rany of the problems
at Pennhurst result from overcrowding and understaffing." 446 F. Supp. at 1303. The problems
included: lack of privacy and forced conformity to an inflexible institutional schedule; inadequa-
cies in the supervised, directed activities that are termed programming (the average amount of
beneficial programming was 15 minutes per day); severe lack of physical therapy and equipment
such as wheelchairs and hearing aids; inadequate "exit" and "program" plans (individual reports,
regularly updated and central to the habilitative effort, that evaluate the residents' needs and
goals, ways to achieve the goals, the residents' progress, and prospects for return to the commu-
nity); overuse of physical restraints, seclusion, and tranquilizing psychotropic medication; lack of
sanitation; deterioration of residents' earlier-acquired skills; and frequent injury to residents
through self-abuse, attacks by other inmates, and occasional mistreatment by staff members. Id.
at 1303-10.
23. Id. at 1318; see text accompanying notes 61-68 infra.
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were permanently enjoined to provide suitable community living ar-
rangements for all members of the plaintiff class, to monitor that provi-
sion, and to develop and periodically review individualized program
plans for each class member.24 A special master was appointed to de-
velop for submission to the court detailed plans for necessary commu-
nity facilities, including various types of small-scale, in-community
residences and support services, as well as plans for the interim opera-
tion of Pennhurst.25 Pennhurst was to be closed as soon as alternative
community facilities could be provided for all its residents.
The Pennhurst court found the right to habilitation26 to be based
on various independent constitutional and statutory grounds. First, the
right is grounded in due process. The only permissible justification for
institutionalizing retardates is the state's parenspatriae interest in pro-
viding them with care and treatment. If habilitation is not provided,
then the nature and duration of the commitment bears no reasonable
relation to its purpose and the due process clause is violated.27 Fur-
thermore, because fundamental individual liberties (for example,
travel, association, privacy, marriage, and procreation) are compro-
mised by commitment and institutionalization, the institutionalized re-
tarded have a right to enjoy habilitation under the least restrictive
24. 446 F. Supp. at 1326. Defendants were also enjoined from admitting anyone else to Pen-
nhurst and from counseling admission. Id. at 1327-28.
25. Pursuant to the interim operation plan, the court enjoined defendants to exert maximum
effort in following Department of Public Welfare regulations concerning use of physical and
chemical restraints and seclusion. Id. at 1328. Defendants were ordered to provide medical serv-
ices, wheelchairs, and adequate sanitation; they were also prohibited from administering drugs as
punishment or for convenience, among other things. Id. at 1329.
Defendants have appealed. No. 78-148 (2d Cir. docketed Apr. 25, 1978). The state moved
for a stay of judgment pending appeal, 451 F. Supp. 233, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Judge Broderick
denied the motion because movant failed to make the four-part showing necessary for success.
Judge Broderick's comments in examining the first two parts of the necessary showing are impor-
tant in assessing the future of the Pennhurst decision: (I) Likelihood of success on appeal. Mo-
vant characterized the court's decision as "novel and precedent setting, both in the rights
enunciated and the scope of relief granted." Id. at 235-36. The court disagreed, pointing out that
its judgment was based on several legal theories, any one of which was sufficient to sustain it, and
most of which have been previously accepted. (2) Irreparable injury to movant. The state
claimed that the expenditure required by the order would be enormous. The court, however,
pointed out that the state had intended to close Pennhurst before litigation and, in addition, had
the benefit of Law of Nov. 27, 1970, no. 256, § 2AX(21), 1970 Pa. Laws 773, which appropriated
21 million dollars for moving Pennhurst residents into new community facilities. Eighteen million
dollars of this appropriation was still untouched at the time of suit. Finally, testimony at trial had
shown that community facilities are about one-third as costly as institutions and that many retar-
dates in the community could earn substantial incomes, further reducing the cost to the state. 451
F. Supp. 233, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
26. See text accompanying notes 70 & 75 infra.
27. 446 F. Supp. at 1315-16.
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conditions consistent with the purposes of commitment.28 This princi-
ple of the "least restrictive alternative" operates to tailor all infringe-
ments of personal liberties to conform closely to a legitimate
governmental purpose.
29
Second, the court found a basis for the right to habilitation in the
eighth and fourteenth amendments' implied guarantees of freedom
from harm.3  And finally the decision identified an equal protection
right to nondiscriminatory habilitation." The court analogized from
the decision in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania,32 which established the right of retarded children to
equal educational opportunity in the public school system in accord-
ance with the mainstreaming (normalization) principle.33 The court
concluded that the segregation of the mentally retarded in isolated in-
stitutions produces habilitative facilities that are separate and not
equal.
34
In addition, the Pennhurst court found violations of title 50, sec-
tion 4201 of the Pennsylvania Statutes35 which provides that the Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare is empowered "to assure within
the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate ...
28. Id. at 1319.
29. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), the Court stated:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can-
not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
30. 446 F. Supp. at 1320. Previous courts have employed the guarantee of due process and
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to mandate improvements in harmful insti-
tutional conditions. See id. at 1316; note 56 infra.
31. 446 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
32. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
33. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, a three-judge panel that included
Judge Broderick determined that retarded children between the ages of four and twenty-one were
entitled under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to receive at least as much
education and training "appropriate to [their] learning capacities" as the state was giving to others.
Id. at 313. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), which was not cited by the
Pennhurst court, established the right to an equal education for children with all types of handi-
caps. Both cases cite Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the proposition that
education, once the state undertakes "to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms." Id. at 493; see 348 F. Supp. at 875, 343 F. Supp. at 297.
34. 446 F. Supp. at 1322. Judge Broderick's analogy between the Philadelphia Associationfor
Retarded Children and Pennhurst situations appears to be based on the great similarity between
"education and training" and "habilitation." Because it is unable to provide minimally adequate
habilitation, Penhurst is unequal to state public school facilities. It is unable to provide mini-
mally adequate habilitation precisely because it is a separate facility. Id. at 1321.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1967).
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mental retardation services for all who need them ... ,6 and of sec-
tion 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,11 which provides in
pertinent part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, . . be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
38
Because the reasoning of the Pennhurst court is occasionally im-
precise and conclusory, examination of the earlier principal cases is
necessary to an understanding of the significance of the Pennhurst deci-
sion in the development of the law regarding the rights of the mentally
retarded. The movement to advance the rights of the mentally retarded
began in the early 1960's 39 with the rediscovery, after almost a cen-
tury'4 of the theory of normalization and the developmental
mode 4 1-practical expressions of the medical community's realization
that normal living patterns are, for the mentally retarded, both an
achievable goal and the means to that goal. With the determination
that the retarded can function in normal society came legal recognition
of their right to be afforded the training and opportunity to do so. Al-
though medical experts generally endorse the right to habilitation,42
case law is not yet unanimous.43
36. Id.; see 446 F. Supp. at 1322 (citing In re Joyce Z., No. 2035-69 (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa., filed March 31, 1975)).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970).
38. Id;see 446 F. Supp. at 1323. The court found that § 504 codified the constitutional right
to equal protection and conferred a private right of action. Id.
39. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 136.
40. Id. at 130-34. Early successful treatment techniques were forgotten when psychiatrists
turned their attention to psychotherapy for the mentally ill. Id.
41. Normalization, or mainstreaming, places the retarded individual in an environment that
resembles as much as possible an ordinary family situation, maximizing his ability to live in soci-
ety. See id. at 136 n.31. The developmental model is simply an outline of stages in human devel-
opment, reflecting the realization that mental retardates are capable of growth and change. Id. at
137 n.32. Essentially, the mentally retarded are considered developmentally delayed but far from
unable to function in society.
42. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 9.
43. See 446 F. Supp. at 1316-17 & 1316 n.52. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
recognized a right to habilitation for either the mentally retarded or the mentally ill. See Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (vacating opinion by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
establishing mental patient's due process right "to receive such individual treatment as will give
him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition." 493 F.2d 507, 520
(5th Cir. 1974)). The Court awarded Donaldson his freedom on much narrower grounds, holding
that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 576. Cases decided in the Fifth Circuit on the basis of its
Donaldson opinion and before the Supreme Court decision, in particular Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), are still authoritative, however. See 446 F. Supp. at 1316 n.52.
There are two federal district court decisions that denied the existence of a right to habilita-
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Medical theory is important in cases in this area" for two reasons:
first, the proposition that the retarded are able to benefit from habilita-
tion is the medical foundation for the existence of the right to habilita-
tion; and second, the evolving medical theories about the capacities of
the retarded and what is best for them affect the scope and content of
the legal right. Pennhurst breaks new ground only on the second
point.45
Legal recognition of the right of the involuntarily committed men-
tally ill to treatment long preceded any attention to the plight of the
similarly situated mentally retarded.4' The first case to deal with the
rights of the institutionalized mentally ill, Rouse v. Cameron,47 was de-
cided on statutory grounds, but the court stated in dictum that involun-
tary commitment of the mentally ill without treatment might well
violate the constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punish-
ment and deprivation of due process and equal protection of the laws.48
tion: Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d
1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (companion case to Wyatt v. Aderhot), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975); and
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973). In New York StateAssociationfor Retarded Children, the court found a constitutional right
to freedom from harm that did not rise to the level of a right to treatment. Id. at 758, 762. Later,
however, in approving a consent decree, the court appeared willing to modify that holding if
necessary. New York State Ass'n. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
The trend in the lower federal courts, however, clearly is toward recognition of the right to
habilitation. This is a rapidly growing area of the law, characterized by test case litigation. See
generally MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT COURT
CASES, supra note 18.
44. The Wyatt court explicitly recognized the importance of expert medical testimony about
"'new concepts in the field of mental retardation.'" 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 n.7 (quoting testimony
of Dr. Phillip Roos, Executive Director for the National Association for Retarded Children). In
Pennhurst Judge Broderick relied heavily on statistics and studies concerning, inter alia, the dele-
terious effect of institutionalization on the retarded, 446 F. Supp. at 1311, and the employability of
retardates in the community, id. at 1312. Many of the most important cases in this area have been
characterized by substantial agreement between plaintiffs and defendants and their respective ex-
perts. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314 (5th Cir. 1974); 446 F. Supp. at 1313, 1325.
The Wyatt litigation was apparently conceived by plaintiffs and defendants together as a way to
extract more money from the Alabama legislature for what both sides considered to be essentials
of care and treatment. Right-to-habilitation cases often culminate in consent agreements, and the
same expert witnesses appear in almost every case.
45. See text accompanying notes 67 & 77 infra. Habilitation is commonly defined in the
institutional ontext, see note 3 rupra, reflefting medical theory upon which the decision in Wyatt
was based.
46. Legal recognition began with an article asserting a due process right to treatment on
behalf of the civilly committed mentally ill. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 449
(1960). The author is a prominent New York City attorney and physician; his work produced an
enormous response in the literature.
47. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 453. This statement contains the basic components of most constitutional argu-
ments for the right to treatment. The court also intimated that the right to treatment might be
violated not only by the giving of no treatment but also by the giving of treatment'inadequate in
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Wyatt v. Stickney, several decisions with the same style concerning
three institutions for the mentally ill and mentally retarded in Ala-
bama, applied the due process right-to-treatment principle to the men-
tally retarded simply by substituting "habilitation" for "treatment."
The Wyatt cases based the rights to treatment and habilitation on the
due process clause, reasoning that civil commitment entails a massive
curtailment of liberty49 that is prohibited by due process unless justified
by a permissible purpose.5" For the mentally retarded that purpose is
habilitation."1  The Wyatt decisions were directed at improving execra-
ble conditions within Alabama institutions.52 To that end, the Wyatt
court developed specific constitutional minima for both the institutions
for the mentally ill and the institutions for the mentally retarded.
53
Wyatt also emphasized the importance of the normalization principle
for the retarded:
Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive conditions neces-
sary to achieve the purposes of habilitation. To this end, the institu-
tion shall make every attempt to move residents from (1) more to less
structured living; (2) larger to smaller facilities; (3) larger to smaller
living units; (4) group to individual residence; (5) segregated from the
community to integrated into the community living; (6) dependent to
independent livdng.
5 4
In addition to echoing Wyatt's due process right to habilitation
under the least restrictive alternative, the later case of Welsch v.
light of present knowledge. See id. at 456-57. This inquiry necessitates the introduction of volu-
minous expert testimony which accordingly is extremely important in these cases.
49. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972); accord, Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972).
50. 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972); accord, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972).
51. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confine-
ment is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the
very fundamentals of due process." 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
52. See note 44 supra.
53. 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Bryce and Searcy Hospitals for the mentally
ill); 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Partlow Hospital for the mentally retarded). The
guidelines generally included, among many other things, minimum staff size, minimum necessary
equipment, and limitations on use of restraints and drugs. They were intended by Judge Johnson
to effectuate his three fundamental conditions for adequate and effective treatment at public insti-
tutions: (1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in sufficient
number, and (3) individualized treatment plans. 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The
Partlow guidelines were used by Judge Broderick in his evaluation of Pennhurst. 446 F. Supp. at
1303.
54. 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972). This invocation of the principle of the least
restrictive alternative, discussed in note 29 and accompanying text supra, represents judicial ac-
ceptance of the developmental model for the mentally retarded, by recognizing a potential in the
retardate for growth and improvement. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 149. It foreshad-
ows to a large extent the decision in Pennhurst.
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Likins"5 recognized that the institutionalized mentally retarded have
broad eighth amendment fights: the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of conditions and practices that shock
the conscience,56 and the right to "humane and safe living while con-
fined under State authority."
57
Although these cases were great advances for the interests of the
mentally retarded, they rested on the assumption that adequate habili-
tation could always be achieved within the institutional context.5 8
Some recent cases recognize that for certain individuals, institutions
can never provide adequate habilitation. These cases have held that
some institutionalized retardates, depending on their individually de-
termined needs, have the right to receive care in settings less restrictive
than those offered by large institutions.59 But Pennhurst is the first de-
cision to find that a particular institution could not adequately serve the
55. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), a f'd inpart, vacated in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977).
56. Id. at 496. Detention for mere status (here, mental retardation), without treatment, is
cruel and unusual punishment. This argument derives from Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (California law making it a crime to be narcotics addict violates eighth amendment).
57. This includes the freedom from harm, see New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); note 43 supra, and the right to exercise,
outdoor activity, and basic hygiene, 373 F. Supp. at 502-03. The decree in Welsch was directed
solely toward improvement of institutional facilities.
58. Although Wyatt and Welsch are significant in their recognition of the principles of
normalization and the developmental model for the factual foundation of their formula-
tion of the constitutional right to habilitation, their approach can be considered only the
rudimentary beginning. The logic of normalization and the developmental model which
Wyatt and Welsch recognize suggests full implementation of habilitation can only be
achieved in a noninstitutional setting. Institutions, by their very structure-a closed and
segregated society founded on obsolete custodial models-can rarely normalize and ha-
bilitate the mentally retarded citizen to the extent of community programs created and
modeled upon the normalization and developmental approach components of habilita-
tion. Neither Wyatt nor Welsch fully implemented the right to habilitation in that they
failed to challenge the very existence of the institution. Consequently, the two institu-
tional characteristics most antithetical to the application of the normalization principle
remain intact: segregation from the community and the total sheltering of retarded citi-
zens in all spheres of their lives.
Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 156.
59. Plaintiff in Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973), challenged, on equal pro-
tection grounds, the placement of some involuntarily committed mental retardates in institutions
while others were placed in community-based facilities. Mason and Menolascino, supra note 1, at
164, contend that "the thrust of the Horacek complaint was the continued legitimacy of the insti-
tution" and that it was "aimed at dismantling the institution." The suit did not succeed in this
aim.
Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975), was a class action brought by inmates
of a mental hospital- the case was decided on statutory grounds, although plaintiffs also raised
constitutional issues. The court held that the hospital had the duty to provide the least restrictive
habilitative settings for its inmates, including noninstitutional community-based facilities. Al-
though this decision was intended to entail a drastic reduction in the institutional population, the
hospital itself was not placed in jeopardy. The court held: "[These plaintiffs have a right to the
treatment sought in this action where the Hospital has determined that such treatment is appropri-
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needs of any of its residents, without regard to the severity of their
handicaps. It has succeeded in shifting the focus of the habilitative ef-
fort from the institution to the community by declaring "institutions
such as Pennhurst" incapable of providing minimally adequate habili-
tation for any mentally retarded persons.60  Although essentially a
straightforward endorsement of the principles of the previous cases,
Pennhurst, by requiring closure of the institution, has, nevertheless,
gone far beyond those cases. The opinion will undoubtedly have great
impact, precipitating efforts to close other institutions and making pos-
sible right-to-habilitation litigation in noninstitutional contexts.
In the effort to close other institutions, future litigants will need to
know why Pennhurst was closed and the extent to which the court's
reasons are applicable to those other institutions. Judge Broderick sim-
ply held: "[O]n the basis of this record we find that minimally adequate
habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as Pennhurst. 61
The reach of the holding, therefore depends upon what "an institution
such as Pennhurst" is, an inquiry to which the opinion gives no clear
answer.
62
It is arguable that the opinion should be read to condemn all pub-
lic institutions. Certain of the characteristics that induced Judge Brod-
erick to label Penmhurst constitutionally inadequate presumably are
typical of most institutions. Indeed, commentators cited in the court's
opinion identify certain common institutional characteristics that they
believe should be fatal for any institution that possesses them. One
article stresses the "segregation from the community and the total shel-
tering of retarded citizens in all spheres of their lives." 63 Another refers
to "existing large-scale geographically remote institutions"'  as the
ones that must close. The Pennhurst opinion focuses on similar attrib-
utes that are inherent in the institutional setting and antithetical to ha-
ate." Id. at 978. The hospital had determined, however, that only 43% of the plaintiff class cur-
rently required care and treatment in alternate facilities.
60. 446 F. Supp. at 1318.
61. Id.
62. Interview with H. Rutherford Turnbull, Associate Professor, Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (September 8, 1978).
63. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 156-57, quoted in 446 F. Supp. at 1318.
64. Burt, Beyondthe Right to Habilitation, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETAR-
DATION, supra note 9, at 418, 427, 432 (1976) (footnote omitted), quoted in 446 F. Supp. at 1321:
[E]xisting large-scale geographically remote institutions cannot by their nature provide
adequate programs to remedy the intellectual and emotional shortcomings and the gall-
ing social stigma that led the retarded residents to these institutions.... A powerful
case can thus be mounted that courts should command states to use extraordinary effort
to avoid institutionalizing retarded citizens.
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bilitation: lack of privacy, enforced conformity to a rigid schedule,
isolation from normal society, confinement, and group living.65 None
of these, however, is specifically identified as a decisive factor.
The court also devotes much of the opinion to the gross deficien-
cies in staffing, equipment, and funding at Pennhurst. Although courts
in earlier cases, like Wyatt and Welsch, chose to cure, not close, institu-
tions with similar problems, the presence or absence of such defects
should not bear on the closure question.66 Clearly these particular de-
fects could have been remedied less drastically than by institutional
closure.
Because it appears, therefore, that closure was mandated by char-
acteristics inherent in the institution, Pennhurst plainly represents ini-
tial judicial recognition of the medical community's realization that
application of the normalization principle demands less restrictive set-
tings than can be achieved within the confines of traditional residential
institutions.67 Pennhurst has not, however, made plain what combina-
tion of inherent characteristics add up to a defective institution. There-
fore, case-by-case adjudication must in the future determine whether a
given institution is enough like Pennhurst to invite the Pennhurst rem-
edy. Because of the wide range of institutional and community care
models that exists, there is enormous potential for such future litiga-
tion; Pennhurst may therefore be a long way from "sound[ing] the
death knell for institutions for the retarded." '68
65. See, e.g., 446 F. Supp. at 1303, 1319.
66. There was some testimony at trial that it would be cheaper to close Pennhurst than to
cure it, see 446 F. Supp. at 1312, but this is certainly not the rationale for the court's decision. Nor
is the argument that plaintiffs would accept nothing less than the closing of the institution, see
Ferleger, supra note 18, at 29, sufficient, since Judge Broderick was not bound by their demands.
67. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 146.
68. Ferleger, supra note 18, at 28 (quoting statement of Judge Broderick made at trial).
Frank Laski, an attorney for Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens in the Pennhurst
litigation, disagrees. Pointing out that a study for the President's Committee on Mental Retarda-
tion ranked Pennsylvania one of the top states in efforts to provide better institutional care, he
reasons, "While there certainly are some mental retardation facilities that could claim some im-
provement over Pennhurst, they are not improvements that make a difference, and none can avoid
the equal protection implications of the Pennhurst decision and order." He names some charac-
teristics, essentially those named by Judge Broderick, that are significantly more prevalent in insti-
tutions than in group homes, and concludes:
While there are important implications in the Pennhurst opinion and order for all large-
scale, segregated institutions housing disabled persons, it is necessary to keep in mind
that the decision and order are based on a factual record about a single mental
retardation institution, and the application of the law of the case depends entirely on the
similarity of the institution in question to Pennhurst and the ability to establish the cen-
tral factual foundation that was established in the Pennhurst case, i.e., that no one need
be kept there, and that given less restrictive arrangements (community facilities), all
could live in the community. On this analysis the direct implication of Pennhurst is
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As the first decision to close an institution and mandate the crea-
tion of community care facilities for all its residents, Pennhurst will in-
variably produce future litigation seeking to secure the right to
minimally adequate habilitation for residents, not of institutions, but of
community care facilities.69 Pennhurst does not reach this issue, be-
cause it, like all previous cases, is concerned only with an already insti-
tutionalized population. Moreover, the court's narrow holding implies
limitations on the right to habilitation that, although not inappropriate
in the past, could make the right difficult to apply in noninstitutional
settings.
The court states its holding as follows: "[W]hen a state involunta-
rily commits retarded persons it must provide them with such habilita-
tion as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and
maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capaci-
ties permit."7 The first problem with applying this holding to the
noninstitutional setting is that it is stated in terms of commitment.
Since commitment in the earlier cases was always to a Pennhurst-like
institution, commitment became equated with institutionalization.
71
And because all the institutionalized plaintiffs had been deprived of
many fundamental rights by civil commitment, the right to habilitation
was always characterized as contingent upon the threat of severe depri-
vation of liberty. 2 Thus, placement in a community facility might be
construed as not involving commitment with consequent loss of liberty
sufficient to give rise to a right to habilitation. 71 Realistically, of
course, the requirement that the right to habilitation be implemented in
community care facilities assumes the existence of the right for persons
clear., it sounds the death knell for all public mental retardation institutions in the
country.
Laski, Right to Services in the Community Implications ofthe Pennhurst Case, HEALTH L. PROJECT
LIB. BULL., May 1978, at 1, 5-7.
69. "It would be naive to think that community programs will escape the problems that
plagued [institutions]." Halpern, The Right to Habilitation, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 9, at 401 (1976).
70. 446 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
71. Retardates can of course be committed to foster homes and other community care facili-
ties, in addition to the more common institutional commitment. P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONs: AN AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIS UNION HANDBOOK 31 (1976).
72. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra; 446 F. Supp. at 1315.
73. The danger might become particularly acute when no institutions exist as alternatives to
community care. Before Pennhurst an individual committed to a community facility had the right
to habilitation because the mere existence of the institution, to which he could be committed at
any time, represented a significant threat to his liberty. After this decision, however, a committed
person potentially no longer faces even the threat of institutionalization, since the institution may
no longer exist.
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in those facilities. Nevertheless, the traditional narrow formulation of
the right upon which Pennhurst relies is not without potential for "un-
realistic" challenges based upon the application of its language to new
settings.
The court's holding also refers only to involuntary, as opposed to
voluntary, commitment, thereby placing another potential limitation
on the applicability of Pennhurst. Some courts have held that the free-
dom to leave an institution at any time (an attribute of voluntary com-
mitment at least in theory) eliminates the need for a right to
habilitation by giving the retardate power to restore at will his lost lib-
erty. Ways were therefore devised to equate the voluntarily with the
involuntarily committed, in order to secure for the voluntarily commit-
ted protection of the right.74 These devices have been so consistently
used in the past that any distinction between voluntary and involuntary
commitment ought for these purposes simply to be eliminated.
In dictum, the Pennhurst opinion refers to the right to habilitation
in broader terms than used in its holding. This broader statement of
the right avoids the potential problem areas in the court's specific for-
mulation of its holding. The court stated, "[W]henever a state accepts
retarded individuals into its facilities it cannot create or maintain those
facilities in a manner which deprives those individuals of the basic ne-
cessities of life."75 This formulation, by avoiding the involuntary com-
mitment language, requires that mere acceptance of the retardate into
the state's hands triggers the right to habilitation, regardless of the
amount of deprivation afforded by different kinds of care and regard-
less of the involuntary or voluntary cooperation of the retardate. In
addition, the right as so stated is applicable to all state facilities, thus
making plain that the right to habilitation exists for those in commu-
nity care even after the closing of the institution has eliminated the
74. One device, used by the court in Wyatt, is to assume that all residents are in the institu-
tion involuntarily, leaving the burden on defendants to show that some are there voluntarily. 344
F, Supp. 387, 390 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Another is to establish the right to habilitation for invol-
untarily committed retardates and then extend the right to voluntarily committed inmates of the
same institution on an equal protection basis. Halpern, supra note 69, at 396; Mason & Menolas-
cino, supra note 1, at 158; Murdock, CI IRights of the Mentally Retarded- Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 153-61 (1972). Pennhurst employed two strategies. One was to argue
that, practically speaking, there is no such thing as voluntary commitment, because (1) few retar-
dates make the choice themselves--rather, their parents make the choice for them, and (2) even
could they themselves choose institutionalization, the absence of alternative placements or com-
munity facilities seriously compromises the true voluntariness of such commitments. 446 F. Supp.
at 1310-11, 1318. The other strategy was the broad statement of the habilitation right, avoiding
the use of the involuntary-voluntary distinction. Id. at 1318.
75. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Judge Broderick emphasized that for the retarded the necessities
include minimally adequate habilitation.
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threat of institutionalization. And because it does not mention commit-
ment at all, but rather makes the right to habilitation contingent only
upon acceptance, the broader formulation provides that the existence
of the right is not affected by the exercise of the state's commitment
function.76 The Pennhurst holding was designed for a system of treat-
ment through involuntary commitment, because no more was required
under the facts of the case; the broader statement, however, may pro-
tect all those in the care of the state, even after future changes in treat-
ment theories, facilities, and practices.77
Even if Pennhurst's broad statement in dictum of the right to ha-
bilitation were taken as authoritative, the decision would not establish
the right as constitutionally fundamental. The court states firmly, "No
constitutional mandate has been called to our attention which would
require a state to provide habilitation for its retarded citizens."7" Just
as education is not a fundamental right,7 9 and its provision is a duty
voluntarily undertaken by the state, so is the provision of facilities for
the retarded. Yet the right to habilitation seems no less secure than the
right to public education-and as states are not likely to close their
schools, neither are they likely to close their community facilities.8 0
The Pennhurst decision is likely to be upheld on appeal.81 The
76. Judge Broderick is opposed to commitment "[Tihis Court entertains serious doubts as to
whether retarded individuals should ever be subjected to 'commitment' ... ." Id. at 1315.
According to the court's narrow holding, if a state were to discontinue this commitment func-
tion, the right of habilitation would no longer exist. This is consistent with the notion that com-
mitment, even to a noninstitutional setting, entails some degree of pervasive and continuing state
control over the individual, including power over choice of facility and restriction of the freedom
to leave. Acceptance, on the other hand, seems to be offered as a more neutral term, perhaps
meaning merely the state's assumption of care.
77. The difficulty of separating medical from legal issues arises because it is the emerging
task of science to define the limits of the retardate's humanity for constitutional purposes; people
of ordinary intelligence had that done for them long ago, before anyone was worried about scien-
tific implementation of the guarantees of a free society.
78. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. The court relied on Welsch, which asserted: "The State is not
constitutionally obligated to provide services to its citizens," 373 F. Supp. at 498, and added: "It is
not disputed that the State could close its institutions for the mentally retarded without offending
the Constitution.' Id. at 499.
79. "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
80. Murdock, supra note 74, at 161, points out that often the state has undertaken to provide
for the mentally retarded under itsparenspatriae power because of the recognized inability of the
private sector to do so. This is especially true since decisions like Pennsylvania Associationfor
Retarded Children and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), see note 33 supra,
have highlighted the importance of educational and other opportunities for the retarded.
81. See generally note 25 supra. It is not unlikely, however, that its most interesting argu-
ment, the equal protection basis for the right to habilitation, will not survive. Essentially, the
equal protection argument depends on recognition of mental retardation as at least a semisuspect
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practical results of the decision will not, of course, be apparent for
some time, given the enormous problems in implementing the compli-
cated orders issued in right-to-habilitation decisions.8" Pennhurst's im-
portance, however, lies in its potentially broad application in future
litigation more than in its results for the particular institution. First,
and least controversially, Pennhurst is another in a growing number of
cases recognizing the institutionalized retardates' right to habilitation.
Second, it provides authority for a new means of achieving habilita-
tion-complete closure of the institution and substitution of commu-
nity care facilities-based upon judicial recognition of changes in
medical theory about what constitutes minimally adequate habilitation
for the retarded. Pennhurst will undoubtedly be a potent and often-
used weapon for the institutionalized retarded; however, because it is
not a precisely formulated decision, it may not be a weapon easy to
wield. And finally, Pennhurst at least begins a redefinition of the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the right to habilitation. Such a redefinition
is necessary to establish the applicability and scope of the right to ha-
bilitation in the noninstitutional contexts that will be created by the
condemnation of institutions and the consequent widespread establish-
ment of community facilities. Because Pennhurst serves not only as a
blueprint for future litigation but as a warning about the constitutional-
ity of future provision of facilities for the mentally retarded, its influ-
ence ought to be far-reaching.
NANCY M. P. KING
Tort Law-Norton v. United States: Federal Government's
Liability Coterminous with That of Its Agents Under
Federal Tort Claims Act Amendment
Prior to the 1970's a United States citizen had no remedy against
the United States Government or individual federal law enforcement
classification requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1,
at 160-64; this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases is not yet an established test.
82. See, ag., Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). Most of the important cases are all still struggling with imple-
mentation and challenge of their courts' orders. See generally MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE
LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT COURT CAsEs, supra note 18; cases cited note 59 supra.
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